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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
the exclusive control of the defendant, then the doctrine is appli-
cable.
The instant case belongs in the last category. The jury, having
the evidence before it, knowing that plaintiff might have had con-
trol of one or more of the factors causing the accident, found that
these factors did not cause it. The defendant then must have had
exclusive control of all the factors causing the accident.
The phrase res ipsa loquitur is nothing but a picturesque way of
describing a balance of probability on a question of fact on which
little evidence either way has been presented. The principle is one
of inclusion and not exclusion and a plaintiff whose case comes
within the principle is entitled to go to the jury and no plaintiff
who makes a probable case is disentitled to go to the jury by the fact
that his case does not come within it or goes beyond it. Washington
Loan & Trust Co. v. Hickey, 137 F. (2d) 677 (C. C. A. D. C., 1943).
WXhile the instant case might be a new step in the use of the doctrine,
it cannot be said to be a change in the rule of res ipsa loquitur. The
essential requirement that the instrumentality must be in the ex-
clusive control of the defendant has taken on added meaning and
possibly it will be well for the courts to give more emphasis to es-
sentials (1) and (3) as a measure to check too great an expansion
of the doctrine through this second essential. To go to the other ex-
treme where a too literal application of the condition of exclusive
control is required may lead to such a result as was arrived at in
Kilgore v. Shepard & Co.. 52 R. I. 151, 158 Atl. 720 (1932), where a
customer in a store sat down in a chair which collapsed. The court
held the rcs ipsa loquitur doctrine inapplicable for the chair in
question was under the exclusive control and use of the customer.
Such application unduly narrows the limits of the doctrine
while the application of the instant case broadens it with the result
that the plaintiff in negligence cases will be able to invoke the aid
of res ipsa loquitur in many situations where it has heretofore been
considered inapplicable.
L. H. B.
PLEADING - ACTIONS - INJURY TO PERSON AND PROPERTY ONE
CAUSE OF A'riON.-In a personal injury action, the common pleas
court of Kanawha county allowed plaintiff to amend her decla-
ration to include damages to her automobile. The circuit court af-
firmed. the amendment to this extent but held it too broad on other
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grounds. On plaintiff's appeal, defendant cited this ruling as cross-
error. Held, inter alia, plaintiff had not changed her cause of ac-
tion by the amendment for the reason that there was but a single
cause of action, the negligent act of defendant. Judgment affirm-
ed. Larzo v. Swift & Co., 40 S. E. (2d) 811 (W. Va. 1946).
The cases are in direct conflict as to how many causes of action
exist when a single tort injures both the person and the property of
another with majority of jurisdictions following the so-called Ameri-
can rule that only one cause of action results, Dearden v. Hey, 304
Mass. 659, 24 N. E. (2d) 644, 127 A. L. R. 1077 (1939) ; King v.
Chicago, Milwawkee & St. Paud Ry., 80 Minn. 83, 82 N. W. 1113, 50
L. R. A. 161 (1900), while the English view, followed by the minor-
ity, is that there are two separate causes of action for which sepa-
rate actions lie. Brunvsden v. Humphrepy, 14 Q. B. D. 141 (1884) ;
Reilly v. Sicilian Asphalt Paving Co., 170 N. Y. 40. 62 N. E. 772, 57
L. R. A. 176 (1902). The instant case adopts the majority view,
stating that the cause of action is the negligent act alone, and "the
elements of damages, consisting of injury to the person and property
of the plaintiff must be joined in the same action" (p. 814). It
relies on Thalman v. Schultze, 111 W. Va. 64, 160 S. E. 303 (1931),
the only earlier relevant West Virginia case in which the court said,
"It is a general rule of common law pleading that a party having a
plurality of claims or causes of action. of the same general char-
acter, against the same defendant, not only can but should unite
them in the same action" (p. 68), and held that plaintiff was not
precluded from recovery because of the union in one count of the
declaration of claims for personal and property injury as the two
claims "may be treated" as different elements of the same cause of
action even though the court indicated the more ordinary and reg-
ular practice is to set them forth in different counts. A fair in-
ference from the case is that there were two causes of action but they
might be treated under the pleading as a single cause of action with
separable parts so as not to preclude recovery. Duplicity would
have been the only ground of objection and it, being a formal defect,
would not constitute a ground of objection in West Virginia since
objections to formal defects, except in pleas in abatement, have been
abolished. W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1943), c. 56, art 4, § 37. Thalman, v.
Schultze cited Chicaqo W. D. Ry. v. Ingraham, 131 Ill. 659, 23
N. E. 350 (1890) for the proposition that claims were joinable in one
count, which case clearly recognizes that two causes of action exist
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but that joinder is possible when no demurrer is filed and no
objection made to the introduction of evidence as to such injuries,
if plaintiff sustains his declaration by proof. However, the late Illi-
nois case of Clancey v. McBride, 338 Ill. 35, 169 N. E. 729 (1920),
held that injury to person and damage to property are separate and
distinct wrongs giving rise to distinct causes of action though re-
sulting from a single tortious act. The other decision relied on to
sustain the holding in Thabnan v. SchzT'tze is not entirely clear but
seems to accept the same position as the Illinois case. See Balti-
more & Ohio R. R. v. Ritchie, 31 Md. 191. 197 (1869). Not until the
instant case has West Virinia treated the cause of action as the
negligent act alone or said that both claims must be joined in one
action. Both West Virginia cases recognize that there are differ-
ences between the claims, for example as to limitations, assignability,
but call these incidental matters to which appropriate procedural
requirements may attend. For contrasting views as to sufficiency
of such circumstances to show legislative intent compare Ochs v.
Public Service Ry., 81 N. J. L. 661, 663, 80 Atl. 495, 496 (1911), with
Dearden v. Hey, id. at 663, 24 N. E. (2d) at 646. The conflict be-
tween the authorities seems basically to arise from contrary views
as to the natur& of a cause of action. At common law, the right to
recover in tort was based upon three elements: (1) primary right or
interest in the one party, (2) corresponding duty on the part of the
other, and (3) breach of this duty by the other to the injury or
damage of the party whose primary right was invaded. SHIPMAN,
COMMON LAw PEADING (3d ed. Ballantine 1923) 77; STEPHEN,
PIADING (Andrew's ed. 1901) § 59; RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934)
281. It is fundamental tort law that negligence which does not in-
vade another's primary right is not actionable. HARPER, TORTS
(1933) 67. There are primary rights not to have either person or
property damaged by' negligence of another. HARPER, TORTs 67;
GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927) 5. If more than one
primary right is invaded by another, no matter how many or few his
acts, it might be supposed that, at common law, more than one
cause of action exists. In support of the American rule is the
policy of the law to do away with unnecessary litigation and, where
one suit will suffice, to make it suffice. However, from common
law reasoning and logic, the conclusion must be drawn that two
causes of action, not one, exist when both person and property are
injured as a result of a single tort. 2 BLAoC, JUDGMENTS (2d ed.
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1902) § 740. Nevertheless, adoption of the majority view may be
justified on the policy considerations noted. To do so suggests
many perplexing problems, however, for instance, if the claim for
injury to property be assigned and recovery had by the assignee
prior to suit for personal injury, will the judgment be res judicata?
B. H. W., II.
WITNESSES--POWER TO COMPEL EXPERT TESTIMONY.-A real
estate expert who had appraised property for a prior owner not a
party to the present action, upon being questioned regarding his
opinion as to the value of the property by the taxpayer in a tax cer-
tiorari proceeding, stated he did not wish to participate in the case
and refused to accept a fee, when called as an expert for plaintiff.
The trial court sustained the witness in his refusal to testify as to
any matter asked him in his professional and not in his lay capacity,
and certiorari was granted on this point. Held, that a witness may
not, against his will, be compelled to give his opinion as an expert.
Judgment affirmed. People ex rel. Kraushaar v. Thorpe, 296 N. Y.
224, 72 N. E. (2d) 165 (1947).
This holding aligns New York with Indiana, Buchanan v. Stae,
59 Ind. 1 (1877), New Jersey, Hull v. Plume, 131 N. J. L. 511, 37
A. (2d) 53 (1944). and Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Transit Co. v.
Philadelphia, 262 Pa. 439, 105 Atl. 630 (1918) ; Moran V. Pitts-
burgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 15 U. S. L. Week 2563 (W. D. Pa. 1947)
in following the doctrine of Webb v. Page, 1 Car. & K. 23 (N. P.
1843), distinguishing between one who sees a fact and is called on in
a court of justice to testify as to it and one selected by a party to
give his opinion on a matter with which he is peculiarly conversant
from the nature of his employment. The reasoning on which this
so-called "liberal" view is based is clearly enunciated in Stanton v.
Rushmore, 112 N. J. L. 115, 1.17, 169 Atl. 721 (1934), stating that
"neither justice nor public policy forbids that the expert shall re-
tain such knowledge and skill free from disclosure other than by his
voluntary act. This is true whether disclosure be sought for com-
pensation for the exercise of his skill, or in the expression of his
professional judgment privately, or as a witness in a court of jus-
tice." The decisions involve and the proposition is asserted only as
to one called as an expert witness in behalf of a private litigant. A
state or the United States may compel a citizen to testify as an expert
in criminal trials or other causes involving the public interest. See
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